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Abstract
We present an extension of the first proof for the unconditional security of the BB84 quantum
key distribution protocol which was given by Mayers. We remove the constraint that a perfect
BB84 quantum source is required and the proof given here covers a range of practical quantum
sources. Nothing is assumed about the detector except that the efficiency with which signals
are detected is basis independent.
1 Introduction
This paper presents an extension of the first proof for the unconditional security of a quantum key
distribution protocol, which was given by Mayers in [15]. The proof given here applies to a more
general class of quantum sources than the perfect single photon source analyzed in [15] and now
covers a range of practical quantum key distribution schemes.
The goal of any key distribution system is to allow two participants, typically called Alice and
Bob, who initially share no information, to share a secret random key at the end of the procedure.
This secret key could then be used by both Alice and Bob to encrypt messages they wish to send to
each other through an insecure public channel they do not trust, so that anybody who intercepts the
encrypted message will learn nothing about the original message. There are many methods available
to encrypt messages, but they all require that Alice and Bob share a private key. As an example
we mention the classic Vernon one-time pad encryption scheme, which requires Alice and Bob to
share a private bit-string k of length n to encrypt a message m containing n bits. Alice computes
the encrypted message m′ via m′[i] = m[i]⊕ k[i] and sends m′ to Bob, who finds m by computing
m′[i] ⊕ k[i]. An eavesdropper who intercepts the encrypted message m′ but has no information on
the private key k will learn practically nothing about the message m.
If Alice and Bob agree to physically meet before exchanging any secret messages, it is of course
very easy for them to generate and share a secret bit-string. However, in the current information
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society in which there are millions of participants who wish to communicate in a private manner,
it is very impractical if not impossible for every pair of parties to meet and exchange keys. One
requires key distribution protocols in which all communication between Alice and Bob is public and
can be monitored by a potential eavesdropper Eve. However, after the protocol has terminated, Eve
should know practically nothing about the key which Alice and Bob share. At the moment, there
are a number of classical key distribution systems which accomplish this task, but they are only
secure by virtue of the limited amount of computational power available to Eve. The classic RSA
cryptosystem for example relies upon the fact that it is extremely difficult to factorize products of
two very large prime numbers. The goal of a quantum key distribution system is to provide users
the comforting idea that the security of the system depends merely on the laws of nature and not
on the unknown capabilities of adversaries. With the possible rise of quantum computers which can
factorize numbers in polynomial time, it can be argued that this is not merely a theoretical issue.
A typical quantum key distribution protocol requires Alice to be in possession of a quantum
source and Bob to have a detection unit, which can perform some sort of measurement on the
quantum states Alice sends. In the BB84 protocol, which was proposed by Bennett and Brassard
[1], Alice’s source should be able to produce photons linearly polarized at angles of exactly 0, π4 ,
π
2 and
3π
4 . Alice chooses secretly and randomly a string of basis-bits a ∈ {+,×}n and a string of
key-bits g ∈ {0, 1}n = Fn2 . For every index i, Alice’s source produces a photon polarized at g[i]π2 if
the corresponding basis bit was + and a photon polarized at π4 + g[i]
π
2 if the corresponding basis bit
was ×. Bob also chooses a secret string of basis bits b ∈ {+,×}n and measures the polarization of
each photon sent by Alice in the + basis or the × basis, depending on b. In this way he determines
a secret bit-string h which reflects the outcome of his measurements. The key observation is that
if Bob and Alice share the same basis-bit for some photon, then g and h will agree, while if their
basis-bits differ, Bob will measure a zero or a one with equal probability. By comparing their choice
of basis a and b after the photon transmissions Alice and Bob can thus decide where g and h agree
and use this information to define a secret key. Any potential eavesdropper Eve who intercepts
the photons Alice sends to Bob has no information on the basis a Alice is using and thus cannot
conclusively decide on Alice’s key-bits g by performing measurements on the photons. Even worse, if
she wishes to remain undetected, she must resend a photon to Bob, which in general will destroy the
correlation between g and h. Intuitively, Alice and Bob can thus detect Eve with a large probability
of success by randomly choosing half of the exchanged photons where their bases a and b agree and
revealing their key-bits g and h for these photons. If there are too many errors they should abort
the protocol, because Eve may know too much, while if the number of errors is small Eve knows
nearly nothing and a key can safely be defined using the remaining part of the photons.
The protocol we consider is a minor variant of the BB84 protocol. Since the introduction of
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this protocol in 1984, a great deal of effort has been spent in order to prove that this protocol is
secure against any attack by Eve allowed by the laws of quantum physics. Many limited attacks
were analyzed [1, 3, 9, 2, 13, 4, 8, 5], but it was only in 1996 that Mayers provided the first proof of
unconditional security [15]. By now, Mayers argument has been followed up by other proofs of the
security of ideal single-photon quantum key distribution [7, 17]. In particular, in [17] the authors
relate the BB84 protocol to an entanglement purification protocol and give a conceptually simple
security proof.
We note here that unconditional security only means that there is no restriction on Eve’s attack.
It thus does not mean that there is no condition on the apparatus used by Alice and Bob and it is
exactly this point that distinguishes the different security proofs now available. The major advantage
of the framework used in the Mayers proof is that it assumes nearly nothing about the detector Bob
uses, as opposed to e.g. the proof in [17], which requires an ideal detector together with an ideal
source. Here the term ideal means that the equipment performs exactly as specified by the protocol.
In [10] a slight extension of the argument in [17] is used to analyze slight deviations from the ideal
source and detector, but there are still explicit assumptions on the source, channel and detector.
The weakness of the original Mayers proof is the assumption that the source emits perfectly aligned
photons at a rate of exactly one per pulse. In practice, perfect single photon sources are not available
and practical implementations use either dim laser pulses or post-selected states from parametric
downconversion. Unfortunately, both signal types contain multi-photon contributions which might
seriously compromise the security of quantum key distribution. In addition, there is always a slight
spread in the polarization axes of the emitted photons.
In [11], Mayers argument is extended to include multi-photon sources and it is shown that
the security of BB84 is maintained if the fraction of pulses that contain more than one photon is
sufficiently small. This paper deals with the issue of the imperfect polarization, by showing that
the BB84 protocol remains secure if the deviation from the perfect source is small, in a sense which
we will make exact. We do not cover the multi-photon situation, but we believe that it is merely
a technicality to apply a similar extension of the type in [11] to the proof given here. Our proof
follows closely the lines of [15, 11] and makes use of the ideas contained therein.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the variant of the BB84 protocol we
will analyze. Section 3 introduces the notion of a quasiperfect source and discusses some practical
types of quantum sources that are included by this definition. We provide exact definitions for the
concepts of privacy and security against tampering in Section 4 and use these definitions to state
our main theorems. The technical proofs of these theorems will be given in Section 5.
3
2 The Protocol
In this section we define the variant of Bennett and Brassard’s BB84 protocol we shall analyze. Alice
and Bob first together specify a number of parameters, then the quantum transmissions take place
and finally a classical negotiation is performed to define the key.
We employ a so-called randomizing box in the protocol, which is assumed to act independently
of Alice and Bob and whose functioning is trusted by both Alice and Bob. In particular, we shall
assume that Eve cannot get at the information in the box before it is announced and Eve cannot
intercept the announcement of the basis-bit to Bob in step (QT5). The presence of this box is merely
a technical convenience in the proof and poses no real restriction on the protocol, since the box may
simply be taken to be Bob’s computer. If Alice does not trust Bob’s computer, she should not be
exchanging a secret key with him in the first place.
The protocol requires that Alice is in possession of a quantum source which, given a basis-bit
a ∈ {0, 1} and a key-bit g ∈ {0, 1}, produces some quantum state ρga, which need not necessarily
be pure. Alice should also be able to send this quantum state to Bob along some quantum channel
which is vulnerable to attack. In Section 4 we shall introduce the constraints on the quantum source
and pre-agreement parameters which are necessary in order for the protocol to be private. However,
we shall assume nothing about the quantum channel or the measurement performed by Bob, except
that Bob’s detector efficiency is basis-independent. Of course, if the key distribution system is to
be practical in a sense that Alice and Bob often share a key at the end of the protocol, both Bob’s
equipment and the quantum channel will have to be adequate. The beauty of Mayers argument [15]
is that these two issues of privacy and usefulness are cleanly separated from each other.
Pre-agreement
Alice and Bob together specify the following operating parameters.
P1. The length m of the private key to be generated.
P2. The threshold δP > 0 for the error rate of the validation test.
P3. The number of bits n > m which should be used for the validation test and for the key
definition.
P4. A positive constant ǫN such that Ntotal = ⌈(4+ ǫN)n⌉ is the number of quantum signals to be
exchanged, where ⌈x⌉ denotes the smallest integer which is at least as large as x.
P5. A security parameter ǫ > 0, which directly determines the asymptotic security level of the
protocol.
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P6. A r × n binary parity check matrix F for some integer 1 ≤ r ≤ n and a m× n binary privacy
amplification matrix K. See Appendix B for more information on parity check matrices.
Quantum Transmission
Alice and Bob repeatedly perform the following procedure, until the number of successfully ex-
changed photons is Ntotal.
QT1. Alice chooses randomly a basis-bit a and a key-bit g.
QT2. Alice announces to Bob that she is about to send a signal.
QT3. Alice prepares the state ρga and sends it to Bob.
QT4. Alice announces the signal has been sent.
QT5. Bob requests a basis-bit b from the box if the previous one has been used. If Bob receives
a signal, he performs a measurement on the received state, giving a value h. He informs
Alice that the photon has been received and the number of successfully exchanged photons is
incremented by one. If Bob does not receive a signal, he announces this and does nothing,
retaining the basis-bit for future use.
Classical Negotiation
Alice and Bob go through the following steps and checks. If one of the checks is not passed, the
protocol is aborted and Alice chooses her key ~κ randomly from Fm2 in such a way that each ~κ ∈ Fm2
has equal probability to be chosen.
C1. The randomizing box announces Bob’s basis~b ∈ FNtotal2 and a random set R containingNtotal/2
positions, which will be used for the verification test.
C2. Bob announces ~h[R].
C3. The random box announces a permutation π of the Ntotal elements.
C4. Alice announces her basis ~a ∈ FNtotal2 and Alice and Bob calculate the set Ω = {i | a[i] = b[i]}
on which their bases agree.
C5. Alice and Bob check that the number of positions in R on which Alice and Bob’s basis agree
is at least n and that the same holds for R = {i | i /∈ R}.
C6. Let SP be the set that contains the first n positions in Ω∩R, where first refers to the ordering
which results after applying the permutation π. Alice announces g[SP ].
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C7. Alice and Bob check that the number of differences dSP between
~h and ~g on SP satisfies
dSP ≤ ⌊δPn⌋, where ⌊x⌋ denotes the largest integer y satisfying y ≤ x.
C8. Let SK be the set that contains the first n positions in Ω ∩ R, where first again refers to
the ordering which results after applying the permutation π. Alice announces the syndrome
~s = F~g[SK] and defines the key ~κ = K~g[SK].
C9. Bob applies error correction to his bits ~h[SK] using the syndrome ~s to get ~h
′[SK] and defines
the key ~κB = K~h
′[SK]. See Appendix B for details on error correction.
3 The source
In the BB84 protocol one requires a source with takes as input a basis-bit a and a key-bit g and
produces a state ρga over some finite dimensional Hilbert space HQ. We shall prove the security of
BB84 for a special class of sources which we call quasiperfect sources. In this section we introduce
and discuss this notion, which is defined formally below.
Definition 3.1. A source which emits quantum states {ρga}g=0,1a=0,1 over some finite Hilbert space HQ
is called quasiperfect with parameters (βqp, γqp) if there exist projection matrices P
g
a and P˜
g
a for
a = 0, 1 and g = 0, 1, such that the following conditions hold.
S1. P 0a + P
1
a = P˜
0
a + P˜
1
a = 1HQ for a = 0, 1.
S2. We have the identity ρ00 + ρ
1
0 = ρ
0
1 + ρ
1
1 and correspondingly define H = ρ
0
0 + ρ
1
0.
S3. TrP gaH = 1 for a = 0, 1 and g = 0, 1.
S4. There exist unitary Ta such that T
†
aP
g
aT = P˜
g
a for a = 0, 1 and g = 0, 1. In addition,
T †aHTa = H for a = 0, 1.
S5. P˜ 0aHP˜
1
a = 0, for a = 0, 1.
S6. P˜ ga ρ
0
aP˜
g
a = P˜
g
a ρ
1
aP˜
g
a , for a = 0, 1 and g = 0, 1.
S7. There exist unitary Sa such that S
†
aP
g
aSa and S
†
aρ
g
aSa are diagonal for a = 0, 1 and g = 0, 1.
In particular, this means that P ga and ρ
g
a commute.
S8. TrP ga ρ
g
a ≤ βqp for a = 0, 1 and g = 0, 1.
S9. Letting Λga be the set of eigenvalues of the Hermitian matrix P
g
aH − P˜ gaH and defining ∆ga =∑
λ∈Λga
|λ|, we have ∆ga ≤ γqp for a = 0, 1 and g = 0, 1.
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The following lemma states some elementary properties of a quasiperfect source which follow
directly from the definitions given above.
Lemma 3.1. Consider a quasiperfect source with the corresponding matrices P˜ ga , P
g
a and H and let
∆ga be defined as in (S9). Then the following identities hold for all a = 0, 1 and g = 0, 1.
P˜ 0a ρ
g
aP˜
1
a = −P˜ 0aρgaP˜ 1a ,
TrP 0a ρ
1
a = TrP
1
a ρ
0
a,
∆0a = ∆
1
a.
(1)
Proof. The first identity follows immediately from properties (S2) and (S5). The last two identities
follow immediately from (S2) and (S1).
In order to give some insight on the practical value of the above rather technical definition of
a quasiperfect source, we give two examples of such a source. In particular, we show that our
definition encompasses the ideal single-photon source analyzed in the Mayers proof [15] and we give
a nontrivial example which is very important for practical key distribution schemes.
We recall that an ideal BB84 source emits the states ρga = |Ψ(a, g)〉〈Ψ(a, g)| with
Ψ(0, 0) =
(
1
0
)
, Ψ(0, 1) =
(
0
1
)
(2)
and
Ψ(1, 0) =
1√
2
(
1
1
)
, Ψ(1, 1) =
1√
2
(
1
−1
)
. (3)
Defining I0 =
(
1 0
0 0
)
and I1 = 12 − I0, we see that
ρg0 = I
g, ρg1 = R(
π
4
)†IgR(
π
4
), (4)
for g = 0, 1, where R(α) is the unitary rotation matrix with angle α.
It is easy to see that this ideal source is also quasiperfect with parameters (0, 0), by taking
P ga = P˜
g
a = ρ
g
a, S0 = 1 and S1 = R(−π4 ).
We now give the nontrivial example of a quasiperfect source which can be seen as a generalization
of the ideal BB84 source. To do this, we consider probability distributions on the interval [0, 2π]. If
p is such a distribution, we define the quantities
sp =
∫ 2π
0 p(α) sin 2αdα, cp =
∫ 2π
0 p(α) cos 2αdα,
s
(2)
p =
∫ 2π
0
p(α) sin2(α)dα, c
(2)
p =
∫ 2π
0
p(α) cos2(α)dα.
(5)
For any angle φ, we define the shifted distribution pφ by pφ(α) = p
(
(α+ φ)mod 2π
)
.
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Theorem 3.2. Consider two probability distributions p0(α) and p1(α) on [0, 2π] and define the
angles φa =
1
2 arctan
spa
cpa
for a = 0, 1. Then the source which produces the states
ρga =
∫ 2π
0
pa(α)R(α)
†IgR(α)dα (6)
is a quasiperfect source with parameters (βqp, γqp), where
βqp = max
(
s
(2)
p
φ0
0
, s
(2)
p
φ1
1
)
,
γqp = min
(
2
∣∣sin(φ1 − φ0 − π4 )∣∣ , 2 ∣∣sin(φ0 − φ1 − π4 )∣∣ ). (7)
Proof. We start by calculating
R(α)†IgR(α) =
(
δg0 cos
2 α+ δg1 sin
2 α (−1)g 12 sin 2α
(−1)g 12 sin 2α δg0 sin2 α+ δg1 cos2 α
)
. (8)
Now recalling that sin 2(α− φ) = sin 2α cos(−2φ) + cos 2α sin(−2φ), we see that
spφaa = cos(−2φa)spa + sin(−2φa)cpa = 0, (9)
by definition of φa. This allows us to write
ρga =
∫ 2π
0
pφa(α)R(α + φa)
†IgR(α+ φa)dα =
= R(φa)
†
( ∫ 2π
0
pφa(α)R(α)†IgR(α)dα
)
R(φa) =
R(φa)
†
 δg0c(2)pφaa + δg1s(2)pφaa 0
0 δg0s
(2)
pφaa
+ δg1c
(2)
pφaa
R(φa).
(10)
Now notice ρ00 + ρ
1
0 = ρ
0
1 + ρ
1
1 = 12 ≡ H . Defining P ga = R(φa)†IgR(φa) and Sa = R(−φa),
we immediately see that Sa simultaneously diagonalizes P
g
a and ρ
g
a for a = 0, 1 and g = 0, 1. It is
also easy to see that TrP ga ρ
g
a = s
(2)
pφaa
, which establishes the claim about the parameter βqp. We also
define
P˜ g0 = R(φ1 − π4 )†IgR(φ1 − π4 ),
P˜ g1 = R(
π
4 + φ0)
†IgR(π4 + φ0).
(11)
Since (
1 (−1)g
(−1)g 1
)(
1 0
0 −1
)(
1 (−1)g
(−1)g 1
)
= 0, (12)
one immediately verifies (S6) by rotating the axis system over −φa. Condition (S4) is satisfied if
one defines T0 = R(φ1 − π4 − φ0) and T1 = R(π4 + φ0 − φ1). Finally, we calculate
∆a = R(−φa)†(P 0a − P˜ 0a )R(−φa) =
(
sin2(ψa) − 12 sin 2ψa
− 12 sin 2ψa − sin2(ψa)
)
, (13)
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in which ψ0 = φ1 − φ0 − π4 and ψ1 = −ψ0. Since the eigenvalues of ∆a are ± sin(ψa), the statement
in the claim about the parameter γqp immediately follows using Lemma 3.1, if we notice that in the
definition (11) we could have flipped the sign in front of the angle π4 .
Remark 3.1. If the probability distribution pa is symmetric around some angle αa, then φa = αa.
The theorem shows how the parameters (βqp, γqp) quantify the deviation of a quasiperfect source from
the ideal BB84 source.
The theorem above illustrates how a security proof which holds when a quasiperfect source
with small parameters (βqp, γqp) is used will significantly generalize the applicability of the original
Mayers proof and will cover a range of practical quantum key distribution schemes. In particular,
since it is never possible in real life to perfectly align the polarization of the emitted photons, the
possibility to allow a small angular spread in these polarization axes is an essential element of a
practical security proof. We remark here that in Theorem 3.2 we required that the shape of the
probability distribution which governs the alignment of the photon only depends on the basis-bit
and not on the key-bit. However, a convenient way to construct a source that satisfies property (S2)
is to introduce an auxiliary system A′ with associated Hilbert space HA′ . One then produces an
entangled state ρAA′ and performs a measurement Ma, which depends only on the basis-bit a, acts
only on the system A′ and has two possible outcomes. If the key-bit g is determined by the outcome
of the measurementMa, the shape of the probability distribution only depends on the measurement
Ma, which justifies the practicality of our assumption.
In this framework it is also possible to analyze the situation in which Eve performs a limited
basis dependent attack, as discussed in [10]. This situation arises for example when we assume
that Eve has supplied to Alice the source used for the quantum transmissions. She could then have
programmed the source to rotate the emitted photon slightly (relative to the ideal source) if the
corresponding basis bit was a 0. She might even let the source vary the cheating strategy. However,
as long as Eve does not know during the quantum transmission phase which cheating tactic the
source is going to apply, it is sufficient to analyze the situation in which the source always emits the
averaged state ρga. We note here that this assumption means that Eve and the source do not share
any non-constant correlated random variables. This includes among others the absolute time and
the number of already emitted photons.
Of course, the issue remains how one can test whether or not a source is quasiperfect and
estimate the parameters. In [14], the authors describe the issue of testing uncharacterized quantum
equipment. They show how to construct a so-called self-checking source which is guaranteed to be a
perfect BB84 source. However, their arguments assume that some specific probability distribution
is known exactly, which is of course never the case. We remark that it may be possible to adapt
9
their argument to include quasiperfect sources, but we do not discuss this issue here.
4 Main results
In this section we state our main results, which concern the privacy and reliability of the BB84
protocol we discussed in Section 2. We shall consider the BB84 protocol in which a quasiperfect
source with parameters (βqp, γqp) is used and where in addition the conditions below hold.
Assumption 4.1. Let λ be such that
λ
1− λδP ≥
1
2
ǫ+ βqp. (14)
The minimal weight dw of linear combinations of rows from F and K which contain at least one row
from K satisfies dw ≥ 2( 11−λδP + 12γqp + ǫ)n, where the weight of a bit-string ~v ∈ FN2 is defined to
be the quantity d(~v,~0), i.e. the number of ones in v. In addition, the matrix F is the parity check
matrix of a linear code which can correct ⌈(δP + ǫ)n⌉ errors. Finally, Bob’s detector efficiency is
basis independent, i.e. the probability that a photon is successfully exchanged between Alice and Bob
is independent of the basis-bit used by Bob.
Consider any possible attack by an eavesdropper Eve on the BB84 protocol. In general, Eve will
record all the classical messages announced by Alice and Bob and perform a number of operations and
measurements on the quantum states transmitted through the quantum channel, possibly combined
with measurements on auxiliary systems. Such an auxiliary system could for example be a random
number generator in order to introduce a certain randomness in the applied eavesdropping tactic.
After completion of all her operations, Eve will have acquired a vector v of information of some kind,
which we will consider to be an element in the set V of all possible outcomes of her experiments.
We will consider the situation in which Eve has a fixed strategy for eavesdropping, that is, if all the
measurements on the external systems yield the same outcome and all the classical announcements
by Alice and Bob are the same, then Eve will perform the same operations and measurements on
the emitted quantum states. In this framework, the eavesdropping tactic employed by Eve defines
a probability distribution P on the product space Fm2 × V , where P (~κ, v) denotes the probability
that the key defined by Alice is ~κ and the information obtained by Eve is v. If Alice and Bob want
the key they share at the end of the protocol to remain secret, then for any tactic employed by Eve
the outcome v should yield very little information about the key ~κ. This measure of correlation is
conveniently expressed by the Shannon entropy HP (~κ | v), which is defined as
HP (~κ | v) = −
∑
~κ∈Fm2
∑
v∈V
P (~κ, v) log2 P (~κ | v). (15)
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Here P (~κ | v) = P (~κ, v)/P (v) denotes the conditional probability distribution of ~κ given v. Note that
in the ideal case the random variables ~κ and v are independent, which means P (~κ, v) = P (~κ)P (v) =
2−mP (v), since each key ~κ is equally probable. This immediately implies H(~κ | v) = m.
Our main result is expressed in the following theorem, which states that, under suitable operating
conditions, the maximal deviation from the ideal value of the conditional Shannon entropy that Eve
can achieve decreases exponentially as n increases, even if the rate of key generation m/n is kept at
a constant level.
Theorem 4.1. Consider the BB84 protocol in which a quasiperfect source with parameters (β, γ) is
used and suppose that the conditions in Assumption 4.1 hold. Consider any eavesdropping strategy
that Eve can employ and let V be the set of all possible outcomes of her measurements. Denote by
P be the associated probability distribution on the space Fm2 ×V for the random variable which gives
jointly the key ~κ ∈ Fn2 defined by Alice and the information v obtained by Eve. Then there exist two
functions ǫ1(n,m, ǫ) and N(ǫ), which are both independent of the strategy employed by Eve, such
that
HP (~κ | v) ≥ m− ǫ1(n,m, ǫ), (16)
for all n ≥ N(ǫ). Moreover, for any λ > 0, there exist constants µ(λ, ǫ) > 0 and C(λ, ǫ) > 0, such
that
0 < ǫ1(n,m, ǫ) ≤ C(λ, ǫ)e−µ(λ,ǫ)n (17)
for all m which satisfy m ≤ λn.
The proof of this theorem will be given in subsequent sections. For the moment, we remark that
Corollary B.3 implies that the number of rows r of a parity check matrix F which meets the conditions
in Assumption 4.1 can be chosen to satisfy r/n ∼ H2
(
2(δP + ǫ)
)
, where A(n) ∼ B(n) means
limn→∞
A(n)
B(n) = 1 and H2 is the binary entropy function H2(x) = −
(
x log2 x+ (1 − x) log2(1 − x)
)
.
In view of this value for r, Lemma’s B.2 and B.4 imply that we can choose a privacy amplification
matrix K with m rows that satisfies Assumption 4.1, where
m/n ∼ 1−H2
(
2(δP + ǫ)
)−H2(2(δP + βqp + 1
2
γqp +
3
2
ǫ)
)
. (18)
To obtain this expression we have substituted 11−λδP ≈ δP + 12ǫ + βqp. We can thus use the BB84
protocol to generate keys at the asymptotic rate m/n given by (18), where the privacy level of
the protocol increases as n increases. In the case where βqp = γqp = 0, this means we can choose
δP = 5% and still generate key-bits at a rate of m/n ≈ 6.2%.
We remark here that the rate (18) is only a worst-case bound and is far from optimal. In
particular, if one relaxes the requirement that the error correcting code can correct all errors with
weight less than (δP + ǫ)n to the requirement that this can be done with probability exponentially
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close to one, it is possible to choose r/n ∼ H2(δP + ǫ). Furthermore, in Remark 5.1 we conjecture
that it is possible to improve the third term in (18), which would lead to the bound m/n ∼ 1 −
H2(δP)−H2(δP + βqp + 12γqp), where we have taken ǫ ≈ 0.
It still remains to address the issue of the reliability of the BB84 protocol. In the situation that
all the verification tests succeed and Bob and Alice have both defined a key ~κB and ~κ respectively,
they will need some assurance that they indeed share the same private key. This is guaranteed by
the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2. Consider the BB84 protocol in which a quasiperfect source with parameters (β, γ) is
used and suppose that the conditions in Assumption 4.1 hold. Then there exists a function ǫ2(n, ǫ),
bounded by ǫ2(n, ǫ) ≤ C(ǫ)e−D(ǫ)n for some C(ǫ) > 0 and D(ǫ) > 0, such that for any tactic employed
by Eve, P (κ 6= κB ∩ P) ≤ ǫ2(n, ǫ), in which P (κ 6= κB ∩ P) denotes the probability that the keys
defined by Bob and Alice are not equal while all the verification tests have succeeded.
Proof. We consider the case where ~a, ~b, ~g, ~h and S = SP ∪ SK are fixed but where R may still
vary, that is, we do not know the partition of S into SP and SK. We write P
′ for the conditional
probability distribution induced by this situation. Since R is uniformly distributed and is only
announced after Bob has made his measurement to determine h, each partition of S is equally
probable. Let E = dS(~g,~h) denote the total number of errors on S. The error correcting code
employed in the protocol can correct ⌈(δP + ǫ)n⌉ errors, which means the keys defined by Alice and
Bob will only differ if dSK(~g,
~h) > ⌈(δP + ǫ)n⌉, while the test P only succeeds if dSP (~g,~h) ≤ ⌊δPn⌋.
First suppose that E > δPn+ (δP + ǫ)n. Then
P ′(κ 6= κB ∩ P) ≤ 2−E
⌊δPn⌋∑
i=0
(
E
i
)
≤ e−2
(
ǫ
4
)2
E ≤ e− ǫ
2
4 (δP+
1
2 ǫ)n, (19)
where we have used Corollary A.4 with p = 12 and t =
1
2 − ⌊δPn⌋E ≥ ǫ4 . Now suppose that E ≤
δPn+ (δP + ǫ)n. Then
P ′(κ 6= κB ∩ P) ≤ 2−E
E∑
i=⌈(δP+ǫ)n+1⌉
(
E
i
)
≤ e−2
(
1
2 (δP+
3
2 ǫ)n
)2
/E ≤ e−
1
4
(
(δP+
3
2
ǫ)2
δP+
1
2
ǫ
)
n
, (20)
where we have used Lemma A.3 with p = 12 and t =
⌈(δP+ǫ)n+1⌉
E − 12 ≥
1
2 (δP+
3
2 ǫ)n
E . Summing over
all conditional probabilities P ′ completes the proof.
5 Proof of Main Result
In this section, we set out to prove our main result Theorem 4.1. To do this, we first introduce two
new protocols which differ from BB84, but for which it is easier to analyze the attack by Eve.
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5.1 Reduction
We shall refer to the first modified protocol as BB84M. It consists of the following modifications to
the BB84 protocol defined in Section 2.
• Before the quantum transmission, the box announces to Alice through a completely secure
channel the positions R.
• In step (QT5), the randomizing box announces the bit b˜ to Bob, defined by b˜ = b if the position
under consideration is in R and b˜ = b otherwise.
• In step (C1), the randomizing box announces b for all positions, as usual.
Note that Bob doesn’t know a priori which positions are in R, so during the transmission phase
he will not know which basis-bit will be announced by the box. The intuitive idea behind this
modification is that in this situation, Bob has measured in the wrong basis for all the positions in
SK and thus has no information about Alice’s key. This modified procedure hence does not define a
key distribution system, but is used only in the proof. In this light, we do not need to worry about
the practicality of any of these modifications (for example, the private announcement of R by the
box to Alice). All that is required is that in principle it is possible. The usefulness of this modified
protocol is established by the following result.
Proposition 5.1. For any strategy adopted by a potential eavesdropper Eve, the random variable
giving jointly Alice’s private key and the information gathered by Eve has the same probability dis-
tribution in both protocols.
Proof. The only thing that has been changed is the announcement of the basis-bit from the random-
izing box to Bob, but this cannot be intercepted by Eve due to the assumption on this box. Since
Alice’s choice for ~a and ~g are equivalent the emitted states are also equivalent. Since Bob’s detec-
tor efficiency is basis independent, the subsets of photons which are successfully exchanged during
the quantum transmission phase are equivalent. Also the information announced by Bob and the
randomizing box is exactly the same, since on R the outcome of Bob’s measurement is unmodified.
Alice does not use the announced string R during the transition phase, so this makes no difference.
So all the information which could be obtained by Eve, from either the quantum channel or the
classical announcements, remains completely equivalent and thus the probability distributions are
equal.
We have seen that it is enough to prove the privacy in the modified protocol BB84M discussed
above. However, if we can prove privacy in a further modified protocol BB84MM in which Eve
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receives more information than in the above protocol and can have a larger influence on the an-
nouncements, then this will immediately also imply privacy of the BB84M protocol and hence the
original BB84 protocol.
In particular, we shall consider BB84MM which consists of the following further modifications
to BB84M.
• Alice generously announces g[SK] in step (C6) instead of merely g[SP ].
• Eve and Bob work together, that is, Bob tells Eve the announcement of the basis-bit he receives
from the box and they together perform any measurement they want to determine a vector ~h.
• Bob announces the complete vector ~h before the announcement of R by the box in (C1).
The next proposition shows that it is indeed sufficient to prove the privacy of BB84MM against
all possible attacks.
Proposition 5.2. Consider any eavesdropping tactic Eve can employ on BB84M and let P be
the probability distribution of the resulting random variable which gives jointly Alice’s key and the
information gathered by Eve . Then there is a corresponding eavesdropping tactic on BB84MM with
probability distribution P ′ that satisfies HP ′ ≤ HP .
Proof. Notice that for any tactic on BB84M Eve can do exactly the same thing to eavesdrop on
BB84MM, by letting Bob perform the same measurement as in BB84M to get h. The only difference
is that now Eve receives more classical information than she did in BB84MM, i.e. v′ = (v, cextra),
where v′ is Eve’s information in the BB84MM protocol and v denotes the information gathered in
the BB84M protocol. We compute
HP ′ =
∑
~κ∈Fm2
∑
v′∈V′ P
′(~κ, v′) log2
1
P ′(κ|v′) =
∑
~κ∈Fm2
∑
v∈V P (~κ, v)
∑
cextra|v
P ′(~κ,v′)
P (~κ,v) log2
P ′(v′)
P ′(~κ,v′) ≤∑
~κ∈Fm2
∑
v∈V P (~κ, v) log2
(∑
cextra|v
P ′(~κ,v′)
P (~κ,v)
P ′(v′)
P ′(~κ,v′)
)
= HP ,
(21)
in which the inequality follows from Lemma A.5. Here we have used the notation
∑
cextra|v
to denote
the sum over all cextra for which (v, cextra) ∈ V ′.
Notice that this final reduction makes it possible to consider Eve and Bob as a single participant
we shall call Eve-Bob, who wishes to find out as much as possible about Alice’s key.
5.2 Formalism
In this section we describe the formalism used to model Eve-Bob’s attack on BB84MM. The system
seen by Eve-Bob can be seen as a state in a Hilbert space Hsys = HC ⊗HS , where HC is a Hilbert
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space which describes all the classical bit-strings generated during the protocol by Alice and the
randomizing box and HS =
⊗Ntotal
i=1 HQ is the state space for the ensemble of transmitted quantum
states. We have HC = span{|c〉}c∈C for some set C of states which we will define later. Each
state c ∈ C will correspond to a classical bit-string and since these bit-strings can be perfectly
distinguished from one another, the corresponding states are all mutually orthogonal.
Any quantum state in a Hilbert space H is fully defined by the corresponding density matrix,
which is a Hermitian linear operator ρ : H → H that satisfies Tr ρ = 1 and (x, ρx) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ H.
For finite dimensional Hilbert spaces such an operator is described by a Hermitian non-negative
matrix with unit trace. The density matrix ρsys for any state in Hsys encountered by Eve-Bob can
be written in the canonical form
ρsys =
∑
c∈V
P (c)|c〉〈c| ⊗ ρc, (22)
where V is a subset of C and P is a probability distribution on V , i.e. P (c) ≥ 0 and∑c∈V P (c) = 1.
For notational convenience, we define the concept of a measurement operator, which will be used
to describe measurements on quantum systems.
Definition 5.1. A measurement operator on a Hilbert space H is a linear Hermitian operator
F : H → H that satisfies (x, Fx) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ H.
The result of a general measurement on a system described in a Hilbert space H can be seen
as an outcome of a random variable q reflecting the measured physical quantity. The probability
distribution of the outcomes can be described using a positive operator valued measure, defined
below.
Definition 5.2. A positive operator valued measure (POVM) on a Hilbert space H consists of a set
of outcomes Q together with a set {Fq}q∈Q of measurement operators on H, such that
∑
q∈Q Fq =
1H. For every outcome q of the measurement, the probability of obtaining that outcome when
performing the measurement on a system with state ρ is given by TrFqρ.
We note here that the POVM description can include measurements performed on external
systems and possible probes attached to the state ρ. We refer to [16] for a general discussion on
generalized measurements.
Eve-Bob’s attack can be seen as a generalized measurement on the emitted state and thus can
be described using the POVM formalism. Actually, two measurements are performed: one before
the classical announcements by Alice and the randomizing box and one after these announcements.
However, it is technically easier to describe the attack as a single POVM acting on the complete
state ρsys. We will use the restriction that the measurement of ~h is made before Alice and the box
make their announcements to derive a constraint on the form of the POVM. To reflect the special
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nature of the classical announcements, we may assume that we can decompose every measurement
operator on Hsys as a sum of terms ΠC ⊗ ES , where ΠC is a projection operator which can be
written as ΠC =
∑
c∈A |c〉〈c| for some subset A ⊂ C and ES is a measurement operator acting on
the state space HS of the photons. Now we may always assume for Eve-Bob’s POVM that each
measurement operator consists of a single term, as we can otherwise split the measurement operator
in multiple operators. This gives more detailed information than the original POVM and hence has
a lower conditional Shannon entropy, as can be seen from the proof of Proposition 5.2.
From now on, we will omit the vector sign on bit-strings if the distinction between a bit and a bit-
string is clear from the context. The set of all classical states is given by C = {(a, g, π,R, s)}, running
over all possible combinations, noting that the syndrome s is a function of all the other classical
variables. We consider the string b˜ announced by the box to Eve-Bob to be fixed during our analysis,
which is why we do not include b as part of the information in C as it can be calculated given R. As
a further convenient restriction, we assume that the set C contains only those classically generated
bit-strings that pass the verification test (C5). Since the key chosen by Alice is perfectly uniformly
distributed if this test fails, it is possible to impose this restriction without loss of generality.
The classical announcements received by Eve-Bob are y = (a, g[SK], R, s, π) and we define Y to
be the set of all such announcements y which are possible under the restriction that the test (C5)
passes. The complete view v that Eve-Bob gets from her measurements is given by v = (y,~h, j),
where j describes any additional information Eve-Bob can infer out of her measurements. Thus Eve-
Bob’s attack can be described by a POVM {Fv} in which Fv = ΠCy(v) ⊗ESv . To reflect the fact that
the measurement of h is also a POVM and occurs without any knowledge of the classical outcomes,
we may write
∑
v|h Fv = 1HC ⊗ESh for some measurement operator ESh . For convenience, we assume
that the set V is finite, which is a reasonable assumption due to the nature of any measuring device.
However, it is merely a technical issue to extend the argument given here to infinite sets V , so this
discussion can be avoided. Without loss of generality, we may also assume that P (v) > 0 for all
v ∈ V , since any view with P (v) = 0 does not contribute to the conditional Shannon entropy. Finally,
we need only consider attacks for which P (P) > 0, where P ⊂ V is the subset of V which consists
of all views v which pass the verification test (C7). Indeed, if this condition is not satisfied, the
protocol is trivially secure since then the key that Alice chooses is independent of her interactions
with Eve-Bob. We summarize the above discussion by defining the concept of a normalized attack.
Definition 5.3. An attack by Eve-Bob on the BB84MM protocol is a normalized attack if it can
be described by a POVM {Fv}v∈V on Hsys, for which the following identities hold.
N1. Every v ∈ V can be written as v = (y, h, j), for some y ∈ Y and h ∈ FNtotal2 .
N2. The set V is finite and P (v) > 0 for all v ∈ V , where P is the probability distribution induced
by Eve-Bob’s attack. In addition, P (P) > 0.
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N3. For every v ∈ V , the corresponding measurement operator can be decomposed as Fv = ΠCy(v)⊗
ESv for some measurement operator E
S
v on HS .
N4. For every h ∈ FNtotal2 , we have
∑
v|h Fv = 1HC ⊗ ESh for some measurement operator ESh on
HS .
The above discussion combined with Propositions 5.1 and 5.2 imply that once we have established
the following result, the proof of Theorem 4.1 will be complete.
Theorem 5.3. Consider the BB84MM protocol in which a quasiperfect source with parameters
(βqp, γqp) is used and suppose that the conditions in Assumption 4.1 hold. Then there exist a function
ǫ1(n,m, ǫ) that satisfies equation (17), together with a function N(ǫ), such that for any normalized
attack on the BB84MM protocol (16) holds for all n ≥ N(ǫ).
The next lemma states some very useful properties that the measurement operators satisfy and
will be used often throughout the proof of Theorem 5.3.
Lemma 5.4. Consider a normalized attack on the BB84MM protocol. For every classical outcome
y ∈ Y, we have∑v|y ESv = 1HS . In addition, for every y ∈ Y and h ∈ FNtotal2 , we have∑v|(y,h)ESv =
ESh .
Proof. The first identity can easily be seen by noting that for each c ∈ C, there is exactly one classical
outcome y which is compatible. We refer to this outcome as y(c). Each projection matrix ΠCy is
diagonal on the |c〉 basis, so we see that 〈c|ΠCx |c〉 = δx,y(c). But since
∑
v 〈c|ΠCy(v)|c〉ESv = 1HS , the
identity immediately follows, using the fact that every y has at least one compatible c. The second
identity can be proved similarly using (N4).
It will turn out to be very convenient to consider the view z = (h, a,R, g[R], π) which gives part
of the information v gathered by Eve-Bob. We write zc = (a,R, g[R], π) for the classical part of
the view z, together with Z and Zc for the set of all possible views z and zc respectively. Upon
calculating the measurement operator for this partial view, we find
Fz =
∑
v|z
Fv =
∑
y|zc
∑
v|(y,h(z))
Fv =
∑
y|zc
∑
v|(y,h(z))
ΠCy ⊗ ESv =
(∑
y|zc
ΠCy
)
⊗ ESh(z) = ΠCzc ⊗ ESh(z), (23)
which expresses the nontrivial fact that the measurement operator for any z remains a simple tensor
product. With similar reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 5.4 we may conclude that for any zc,∑
z|zc
ESh(z) = 1HS . (24)
The following lemma shows how we can reduce a trace over the complete space Hsys into a trace
which runs merely over the state space for the photons HS .
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Lemma 5.5. Consider a density matrix ρsys of a state in Hsys = HC ⊗HS of the form
ρsys =
∑
c∈V
P (c)|c〉〈c| ⊗ ρc, (25)
where ρc is a density matrix of a state in HS and P is a probability distribution on V . Consider a
measurement operator of the form
F =
(∑
c∈A
|c〉〈c|
)
⊗ FS , (26)
where A ⊆ V . Then for any linear operators W 1 and W 2 acting on HS, we have
TrHsys
(
FW 1ρsysW
2
)
= P (A)TrHS (F
SW 1ρsys,AW
2), (27)
where ρsys,A is given by 1HS/Tr1HS if P (A) = 0 and otherwise by
ρsys,A =
1
P (A)
∑
c∈A
P (c)ρc. (28)
Proof. We have
Tr (FW 1ρsysW
2) =
∑
c inA
∑
c′∈V
P (c′)Tr (|c〉〈c|c′〉〈c′|)Tr (FSW 1ρc′W 2) (29)
Noticing Tr (|c〉〈c|c′〉〈c′|) = δcc′ , we see that the above expression reduces to∑
c∈A
P (c)Tr (FSW 1ρcW
2) = Tr (FSW 1
∑
c∈A
P (c)ρcW
2). (30)
From this the claim immediately follows.
Let us consider the setting described in Theorem 5.3. We define the function g(n, ǫ) = e−ǫ
2n +
e−
1
2 ǫ
2n, which vanishes exponentially as n increases. For any integer N and any two bitstrings
b, w ∈ FN2 we introduce the notation P˜ ~w~b =
⊗N
i=1 P
w[i]
b[i] . We also define, for any z ∈ Z and any
constant ǫL > 0, the projection operator Π˜0(z, ǫL) via
Π˜0(z, ǫL) =
∑
~w∈W (z,ǫL)
P˜ ~w
~˜b
, (31)
where W (z, ǫL) = {~w ∈ FNtotal2 | dSK(~w,~h(z)) ≥ ( 11−λδP + 12γqp + ǫL)n}, in which λ is defined by
(14). Using the above definitions, we introduce the subset of views LǫL ⊂ P ⊂ V , defined by
LǫL =
{
v ∈ P | Tr
[
FvΠ˜0(z, ǫL)ρΠ˜0(z, ǫL)
]
≤
√
g(n, ǫ)P (v)
}
. (32)
In [15], views v ∈ L were said to satisfy the small sphere property. Our approach to proving Theorem
5.3 will be to decompose the state emitted by the source via ρ =
(
(Π˜0+(1−Π˜0)
)
ρ
(
Π˜0+(1−Π˜0)
)
and
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correspondingly split the expression P (κ, v) = TrFκ,vρ. For views which satisfy the small sphere
property we shall use the fact that TrFκ,vΠ˜0ρΠ˜0 is small to bound the differences P (κ1, v)−P (κ2, v),
which proves that v does not yield a significant amount of information on the key κ. The following
proposition roughly says that almost every view v ∈ P satisfies the small sphere property, which
makes it reasonable to assume that views which do not possess this property do not pose a large
security threat.
Proposition 5.6. Consider the BB84MM protocol in which a quasiperfect source with parameters
(βqp, γqp) is used and suppose that the conditions in Assumption 4.1 hold. Consider any normalized
attack by Eve-Bob on BB84MM and let P be the associated probability distribution. Then P (Lǫ) ≥
P (P)−√g(n, ǫ).
Proof. We consider a slight variant of BB84MM, consisting of the following modifications.
• For each position in R, Alice’s source produces ρa¯ instead of ρa.
• For each position in R, Alice applies the unitary transformation T †a¯ρTa¯ to the photon, which
makes it diagonal in the P˜a¯ measurement basis.
• Alice performs a measurement on each photon before sending it to Eve-Bob. For each position
i in R, Alice measures in the Pa[i] basis, while for each position in R, Alice measures in the
P˜a¯[i] basis. Alice records the results as gT for future reference.
Let ρ′ denote the state emitted by the source in this modified protocol and write P ′ for the probability
distribution defined by Eve-Bob’s attack on this modified protocol. For convenience, we define
δ = δP1−λ . Without loss of generality, we shall assume that the first
Ntotal
2 positions belong to R and
the second Ntotal2 positions belong to R. We write vT = (a,R, gT ) for the results received by Alice
and let VT be the set of all possible results Alice can receive. We can then model the measurement
of Alice as a POVM {
ΠvT = Π
C
a,R ⊗ P (a,R, gT [R])P˜ (a,R, gT [R])
}
vT ∈VT
, (33)
in which
P (a,R, gT [R]) =
⊗ 1
2Ntotal
i=1 P
gT [i]
a[i] ⊗ 1H⊗ 12Ntotal
S
,
P˜ (a,R, gT [R]) = 1
H
⊗ 1
2
Ntotal
S
⊗⊗Ntotali= 12Ntotal+1 P˜ gT [i]a¯[i] (34)
Notice that in this case, each measurement operator is in fact a projection operator. This allows us
to compute the state seen by Eve-Bob after Alice’s measurement, which is simply Πρ′Π if Π is the
projection operator associated with the outcome received by Alice.
We now define a test T , which is a function of Eve-Bob’s announcement of h and the results
of Alice’s measurement gT . The test T succeeds if the number dSP (h, gT ) of differences between h
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and gT on SP satisfies dSP (h, gT ) ≤ δn, while the number of differences dSK(h, gT ) on SK satisfies
dSK(h, gT ) ≥ (δ + 12γqp + ǫ)n. Formally, we can consider T to be a subset of the combined view
Z × VT . Letting T (z) ⊆ VT be the set of Alice’s views which pass the test given a value of z, we
can write T = ⋃z∈Z z × T (z). We can thus calculate
P ′(T ) =
∑
z∈Z
P ′(z, T (z)) =
∑
z∈Z
P ′(z | T (z))P ′(T (z)). (35)
The interesting thing to note is that if T (z) is true, we know that the state after Alice’s measurement
is given by (Trφ)−1φ where φ =
∑
vT ∈T (z)
ΠvT ρ
′ΠvT . Now note that∑
vT ∈T (z)
ΠvT = Π
C
a,R ⊗
( ∑
gT ∈G(z)
P (a,R, gT [R])P˜ (a,R, gT [R])
)
= ΠCa,R ⊗Π1(z)Π˜0(z). (36)
in which G(z) = {gT | dSP (gT , h) ≤ δn ∧ dSK(gT , h) ≥ (δ + 12γqp + ǫ)n} and
Π1(z) =
∑
~w∈W1(z)
P ~w
~˜b
, (37)
where W1(z) = {w ∈ FNtotal2 | dSP (w, h(z)) > δn}. Here we have used that b˜[i] = a[i] for every
position i ∈ SK and b˜[i] = a[i] for every position i ∈ SP , together with the completeness condition
(S1).
The important observation now is that each emitted photon is diagonal on the basis it is measured
in, which allows us to write∑
vT ∈T (z)
ΠvT ρ
′ΠvT = (
∑
vT ∈T (z)
ΠvT )ρ
′(
∑
vT ∈T (z)
ΠvT ). (38)
Now define the projection operators ΠT (z) and Π
S
T (z) via
∑
vT ∈T (z)
ΠvT = ΠT (z) = Π
C
a,R,π ⊗ ΠST (z)
and note that
ΠST (z) = Π1(z)Π˜0(z). (39)
Suppose now that Alice announces the result of her measurement gT on each photon after Eve-
Bob have announced h. Given the partial outcome of Bob-Eve’s measurement h, Eve-Bob can now
announce a string Rguess, defined by Rguess[i] = 1 ⊕ gT [i]⊕ h[i], where ⊕ denotes addition modulo
two. Denote by T ′ ⊆ Z × VT the set of all events such that Rguess differs from R on SK ∪ SP on at
most n(1 − 12γqp − ǫ) different positions, where we write R[i] = 1 if i ∈ R and R[i] = 0 otherwise.
Then it is the case that T ⊆ T ′, since the total number of differences between Rguess and R for any
combined view in T is bounded by
dP(Rguess, R) + dK(Rguess, R) ≤ δn+ n(1− (δ + 1
2
γqp + ǫ)) = n(1− 1
2
γqp − ǫ). (40)
Since Eve-Bob has no classical information when measuring h and in particular does not know
R, a correct announcement for Rguess[i] for some position i ∈ SP ∪ SK corresponds to a correct
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distinguishing of the state P
gT [i]
b˜[i]
H from P˜
gT [i]
b˜[i]
H . Here we have used (S3) and P
gT [i]
b˜[i]
HP
gT [i]
b˜[i]
=
P
gT [i]
b˜[i]
H , together with a similar identity for P˜ , which both follow from (S4), (S7) and the fact that
each emitted photon is diagonal on the basis it is measured in.
Theorem A.2 in combination with (S9) shows that that the success rate for a correct announce-
ment of Rguess on any 0 ≤ s ≤ 2n positions is bounded from above by (12 + 14γqp)s, since each
position in SK ∪ SP has probability 12 to be in R. Thus, even if Eve-Bob chooses the optimal
strategy for determining Rguess which has success rate psuc =
1
2 +
1
4γqp, the probability P
′(T ′) that
dSK∪SP (Rguess, R) ≤ 2n(12 − 12ǫ− 14β) can be bounded from above by
P ′(T ′) ≤
∑
2n( 12+
1
2 ǫ+
1
4β)≤i≤2n
(
2n
i
)
pisuc(1− psuc)2n−i ≤ e−ǫ
2n, (41)
in which we have used Lemma A.3 with t = 12 +
1
2ǫ +
1
4β − psuc = 12ǫ. We thus obtain P ′(T ) ≤
P ′(T ′) ≤ e−ǫ2n.
On the other hand, we can use (35) to compute
P ′(T ) = ∑z∈Z P (z | T (z))P (T (z))
=
∑
z∈Z
(
TrFzΠT (z)ρ
′ΠT (z)/(TrΠT (z)ρ
′)
)(
TrΠT (z)ρ
′
)
=
∑
z∈Z TrFzΠT (z)ρ
′ΠT (z) =
∑
z∈Z TrΠ
C
zc ⊗ ESh(z)ΠST (z)ρ′ΠST (z).
(42)
We can now use Lemma 5.5 to transform the above expression into
P ′(T ) =
∑
z∈Z
P ′(zc)Tr (E
S
h(z)Π
S
T (z)ρ
′
zcΠ
S
T (z)), (43)
We remark here that the above expression resembles the definition of L in (32), except for the
presence of the projection operator Π1. The idea is that for views in P , Π1ρ′Π1 ≈ ρ′ in some sense,
since the number of errors on SP is small. We thus set out to bound the quantity
∆ =
∑
z∈P
Tr
(
FzΠ
S
T (z)ρ
′ΠST (z)) − FzΠ˜0ρ′Π˜0
)
. (44)
We can use Lemma 5.5 in combination with the expression (39) for ΠST (z) to explicitly split the sum
over z ∈ P and write
∆ =
∑
zc∈Zc
∑
z∈Vzc∩P
P (zc)TrE
S
z
(
Π1Π˜0ρ
′
zcΠ1Π˜0 − Π˜0ρ′zcΠ˜0
)
, (45)
where Vzc = {z′ ∈ Z | z′c = zc}.
From now on, we shall consider zc to be fixed, so we consider each term in the sum above
individually. Note that zc contains information on the value g for each bit in R. We can thus write ρ
′
zc
as a tensor product (possibly after reordering bits) ρ′R⊗ρ′R, in which ρ′R = 2−|R|H⊗|R|. Let a = a(zc)
and define the unitary matrix Ua which diagonalizes ρ
′
zc , Π˜0 and Π1 simultaneously. Such a matrix
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exists due to our assumptions (S7) and (S4) on the source, by letting Ua =
⊗
R Sa[k]⊗
⊗
R Sa¯[k]T
†
a¯[k].
Note that Π1 operates only on ρ
′
SP
while Π˜0 operates only on ρ
′
SK
. In addition, since Ua depends
only on the classical part of z, we have for any z ∈ Vzc
TrESz
(
Π1Π˜0ρ
′
zcΠ1Π˜0 − Π˜0ρ′zcΠ˜0
)
=
TrU †aE
S
z Ua
(
U †a[R](1−Π1)Ua[R]U †a[R]ρ′RUa[R]U †a[R](1−Π1)Ua[R]⊗
U †
a[R]
Π˜0Ua[R]U
†
a[R]
ρ′
R¯
Ua[R]U
†
a[R]
Π˜0Ua[R]
)
=
TrU †aE
S
z Ua
(
Πd1ρ
′d
RΠ
d
1 ⊗ Π˜d0ρ
′d
R
Π˜d0
) (46)
where everything marked with a superscript d has been diagonalized.
We now, independently of the non-classical part of z, bound each diagonal element of Πd1ρ
′d
RΠ
d
1⊗
Π˜d0ρ
′d
R¯
Π˜d0. Without loss (possibly rearrange matrix positions) we shall assume the identities
P d,aa =
(
1daa 0
0 0
)
, P d,a¯a =
(
0 0
0 1da¯a
)
, (47)
ρd,aa = diag(α
a
1,2, . . . α
a
a,daa
, βaa,1, . . . , β
a
a,da¯a
), ρd,a¯a = diag(β
a¯
a,1, . . . β
a¯
a,daa
, αa¯a,1, . . . α
a¯
a,da¯a
). (48)
For intuition purposes, we remark that the α values are in general large when compared to the β
values. It is easy to see that (after rearranging), Πd1 = Π
d
1,SP
⊗ 1rest′ . Also write ρ′dR = ρ
′d
SP
⊗ ρ′drest′ .
We now consider the diagonal Dn × Dn matrix Πd1,SPρ
′d
SP
Πd1,SP , where D is the dimension of the
state space for a single photon HQ. Let w be a string in {0, 1, . . .D − 1}n and let e(w) be the
corresponding w-th diagonal element of ρ
′d
SP
, that is,
e(w) =
n∏
i=1
(
ρ
d,gSP [i]
aSP [i]
)
w[i]w[i]
. (49)
Similarly, we define p(w) to be the w-th diagonal element of Πd1,SP . Please note that p(w) = 1 if
and only if dSP (w, h) > δn. Using the fact that the test P has passed, we know dSP (g, h) ≤ δPn =
(1− λ)δn. Thus using the identity d(w, g) ≥ d(w, h)− d(h, g) ≥ (δ − (1− λ)δ)n = λδn, we see that
if p(w) = 1 we must have dSP (w, g) ≥ λδn. Since this last inequality depends only on the value of
g, we obtain the following bound, which only depends on zc,
p(w)e(w)p(w) ≤ max(0, dSP (w, g) − λδn)
n∏
i=1
(
ρ
d,gSP [i]
aSP [i]
)
w[i]w[i]
≡ B(w). (50)
Now, noting that (24) implies that for any u ∈ {0, . . . , D−1}Ntotal it holds that∑z∈Vzc∩P(U †aESz Ua)uu ≤
1, one derives the inequality∑
z∈Vzc
T (z) ≤ Tr ρ′drest′ ⊗ ρ
′d
R¯
∑
w∈{0,1,...D−1}n
B(w) =
∑
w∈{0,1,...D−1}n
B(w). (51)
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Defining V = {(a, b, c, d) ∈ N40 | (a+ b + c+ d) ≥ λδn} and W = {0, 1, . . .D − 1}n, we compute
∑
w∈W
B(w) =
∑
(i00,i
1
0,i
0
1,i
1
1)∈V
∏
a=0,1
g=0,1
(
Nga
iga
) ∑
w∈{1,...,dg¯a}i
g
a
iga∏
j=1
βga,w[j]
∑
w′∈{1,...,dga}N
g
a−i
g
a
Nga−i
g
a∏
j′=1
αga,w′[j′], (52)
where Nga is the number of positions in SP that have basis-bit a and key-bit g. This can be seen
by noting that given a choice of distance dSP (w, g) ≥ λδn and a distribution of the errors over
the different bits, which can occur with
∏
a,g
(Nga
iga
)
possibilities, there are still
∏
a,g (d
g¯
a)
iga (dga)
Nga−i
g
a
compatible strings in w. Summing over the e(w) values for these strings gives the above expression.
Now notice that for any d, s ∈ N and any set of reals γ1, . . . γd, we have
∑
w∈{1,...,d}s
s∏
j=1
γw[j] = (
d∑
j=1
γj)
s. (53)
This can be easily seen by expanding the power. Using this, we obtain∑
w∈W B(w) =
∑
(i00,i
1
0,i
0
1,i
1
1)∈V
∏
a=0,1
g=0,1
(Nga
iga
)
(
∑dg¯a
j=1 β
g
a,j)
iga(
∑dga
j=1 α
g
a,j)
Nga−i
g
a =
∑
(i00,i
1
0,i
0
1,i
1
1)∈V
∏
a=0,1
g=0,1
(Nga
iga
)
β
iga
a (1 − βa)Nga−iga =∑
(i0,i1)∈V ′
(
N0
i0
)(
N1
i1
)
βi00 (1− β0)N0−i0βi11 (1− β1)N1−i1 ≤ e−
1
2 ǫ
2n,
(54)
where V ′ = {(i, j) ∈ N20 | i + j ≥ λδn} and βa =
∑d1a
j=1 β
0
a,j =
∑d0a
j=1 β
1
a,j . This was obtained using
Lemma A.3, with
t = λδ −max(β0, β1) = λ
1− λδP −max(TrP
1
0 ρ
1
0,TrP
0
1 ρ
0
1) ≥
λ
1− λδP − βqp ≥
1
2
ǫ, (55)
where the last inequality follows from the assumption (14).
Finally, this means we have obtained
∆ ≤
∑
zc∈Zc
P ′(zc)e
−ǫ2n = e−
1
2 ǫ
2n (56)
and hence ∑
z∈P
TrFzΠ˜0ρ
′Π˜0 =
∑
z∈P
P ′(zc)TrE
S
z Π˜0ρ
′
zcΠ˜0 ≤ e−ǫ
2n + e−
1
2 ǫ
2n. (57)
We can now use the fact that since zc contains no information on g[R], ρ
′
zc = 2
−|R|ρ′R ⊗ H⊗|R|.
However this also holds for the state emitted in the real protocol, so we have ρzc = ρ
′
zc . In addition,
since the modifications do not influence the choice of g[R], a, R and π, we have P ′(g[R], a, R, π) =
P (g[R], a, R, π). This allows us to write∑
z∈P
TrFzΠ˜0ρΠ˜0 =
∑
v∈V∩P
TrFvΠ˜0ρΠ˜0 ≤ g(n, ǫ). (58)
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We now employ Lemma A.6 with the probability distribution PP (v) = P (v | P) = P (v)/P (P)
on P and q = P (P)g(n, ǫ)− 12 to conclude that
PP(L) ≥ 1−
√
g(n, ǫ))/P (P). (59)
The claim now follows upon multiplying both sides of the above identity by P (P).
Corollary 5.7. Suppose that ǫd ≥ ǫ. Then P (Lǫd) ≥ P (P)−
√
g(n, ǫ).
Proof. The proof of Proposition 5.6 goes through if we replace ǫ by ǫd everywhere. Since g(n, ǫd) ≤
g(n, ǫ), we see that{
v ∈ P | Tr
[
FvΠ˜0(z, ǫd)ρΠ˜0(z, ǫd)
]
≤
√
g(ǫd, n)P (v)
}
⊆ Lǫd (60)
and hence P (Lǫd) ≥ 1−
√
g(n, ǫd) ≥ 1−
√
g(n, ǫ), which establishes the claim.
The following proposition will be used to extract the key independent part of the probability
distribution P (κ, v). The assumption (S6) on the source plays a crucial role in the proof.
Proposition 5.8. Consider a BB84 source that is quasiperfect with parameters (βqp, γqp). Let F
be an arbitrary r × n binary matrix and K be a m × n binary matrix, for some integers m,r and
n which satisfy 0 ≤ m, r ≤ r +m ≤ n. Define dw to be the minimal weight of linear combinations
of rows from F and K which contain at least one row from K. Suppose that two arbitrary strings
b, h ∈ Fn2 and a constant d′′ are given, such that d′′ ≤ 12dw. Let X be a measurement operator acting
on H⊗nQ such that XP˜
~j
~b
= 0 for all strings j ∈ Fn2 which satisfy d(h, j) ≥ d′′. For any κ ∈ Fm2 and
s ∈ Fr2, define the set
Cκ,s = {g ∈ Fn2 | Fg = s and Kg = κ} (61)
and the state
ρκ,s,b¯ =
1
|Cκ,s|
∑
g∈Cκ,s
n⊗
k=1
ρ
g[k]
b¯[k]
. (62)
Then TrXρκ,s,b¯ is independent of κ.
Proof. It is enough to show that for any two keys κ, κ′ ∈ Fm2 and ∆ρ = ρκ,s,b¯ − ρκ′,s,b¯, we have
P˜ kb ∆ρP˜
l
b = 0 (63)
for all strings k, l ∈ Fn2 which satisfy d(k, l) < dw. Indeed, assuming this, write
TrX∆ρ =
∑
k
∑
l TrXP˜
k
b ∆ρP˜
l
b =
∑
k,l|d(k,l)≥dw
TrXP˜ kb ∆ρP˜
l
b
=
∑
k,l|d(k,l)≥dw
Tr P˜ lbXP˜
k
b ∆ρ.
(64)
It can be seen that for every pair of strings k, l ∈ Fn2 with d(k, l) ≥ dw, either XP˜ kb = 0 or
P˜ lbX = 0. Indeed, assuming the contrary, then d(k, h) <
1
2dw and also d(l, h) <
1
2dw. However
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d(k, l) ≤ d(k, h) + d(h, l) < dw, which immediately gives a contradiction. This fact now implies
TrX∆ρ = 0, which is the claim stated in the lemma.
We thus set out to show (63). Using (S6) and Lemma 3.1, we can define the matrices
αab = P˜
a
b¯ ρ
0
bP˜
a
b¯ = P˜
a
b¯ ρ
1
b P˜
a
b¯ (65)
and
βab = P˜
a
b¯ ρ
0
bP˜
a¯
b¯ = −P˜ ab¯ ρ1bP˜ a¯b¯ . (66)
With these definitions, for any four bits b, d, e, f ∈ F2 we can define the matrix V d,e,fb by
V d,e,fb = P˜
d
b¯ ρ
e
bP˜
f
b¯
= (βdb )
d⊕f (−1)(d⊕f)e(αdb )d⊕f⊕1, (67)
where ⊕ denotes addition modulo two. We extend this definition to bit-strings b, d, e, f ∈ Fn2 by
writing Vd,e,fb =
⊗n
i=1 V
d[i],e[i],f [i]
b[i] . Since V
d,e¯,f
b = (−1)d⊕fV d,e,fb , we obtain the following identity
for any bit-string e′ ∈ Fn2
Vd,e⊕e′,fb = (−1)e
′·(d⊕f)Vd,e,fb . (68)
Let G be the matrix
G =
(
K
F
)
(69)
and write x = (κ, s) ∈ Fr+m2 and ρx = ρκ,s,b¯. Let Cx be the set of g ∈ Fn2 which satisfies Gg = x.
Notice that indeed Cx = Cκ,s,b¯ and that for every g ∈ Cx, one can write Cx = g ⊕ C0. Defining
(ρx)kl = P˜
k
b¯
ρxP˜
l
b¯
and fixing any θ ∈ Cx, we calculate
(ρx)kl = P˜
k
b¯
ρxP˜
l
b¯
= 1|Cx|
∑
g∈Cx
Vk,g,lb = 1|Cx|
∑
g∈C0
Vk,g⊕θ,lb =
(−1)θ·(k⊕l) 1|Cx|
∑
g∈C0
Vk,g⊕θ,lb = (−1)θ·(k⊕l)P˜ kb¯ ρ0P˜ lb¯ = (−1)θ·(k⊕l)(ρ0)kl.
(70)
The above identity shows that it is sufficient to compute (ρ0)kl, which we therefore set out to
do. Write |C0| = 2q, where q is the dimension of C0 and let {θ1, . . . , θq} be q linearly independent
bit-strings which span C0. For 0 ≤ j ≤ q, let C(j) be the span of the strings θ1, . . . θj and ρ(j) =
1
|C(j)|
∑
g∈C(j) ρ(g, b¯), in which ρ(g, b¯) =
⊗n
i=1 ρ
g[i]
b¯[i]
. Notice that ρ(q) = ρ0 and ρ
(0) = ρ(0, b¯). We
shall prove by induction that for all 0 ≤ j ≤ q, the following identity holds
(ρ(j))kl =
{
Vk,0,lb if (k ⊕ l) ∈ C(j)⊥,
0 otherwise.
(71)
The j = 0 case is trivial in view of the definition of V and the fact that C(0)⊥ = Fn2 . Now,
C(j+1) = C(j) ∪ (C(j) ⊕ θj+1), so
(ρ(j+1))kl =
1
2
(ρ(j))kl(1 + (−1)(k⊕l)·θj+1). (72)
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Note that C(j+1)⊥ = C(j)⊥ ∩ {θj+1}⊥. Observe also that if (ρ(j+1))kl 6= 0, we must have that
k⊕ l ∈ C(j)⊥ and (k⊕ l) · θj+1 = 0mod2, which precisely means that k⊕ l ∈ C(j+1)⊥. In this case,
we see that (ρ(j+1))kl = (ρ
(j))kl, which concludes the induction argument.
Now, using (70), we see that for every θ ∈ Cx, we have (ρx)kl = (−1)(k⊕l)·θ(ρ0)kl. Also, every
string j ∈ C⊥0 can be written as a unique linear combination of rows of G, i.e. there exists a function
λ with λ(j) ·G = j for every j in C⊥0 . We can thus write, using Gθ = x,
(ρx)kl = (−1)λ(k⊕l)·x(ρ0)kl. (73)
We are now ready to complete the proof. We know that if d(k, l) = w(k ⊕ l) < dw and k ⊕ l ∈ C⊥0 ,
then we must have by definition of dw that k ⊕ l is a sum of rows of F only. This however means
that λ(k ⊕ l) · (κ, s) is independent of κ, which immediately establishes the claim.
Remark 5.1. We conjecture that it is possible to generalize the argument above, if we assume
that the probability of a random linear combination of rows from K and F that contains at least
one row from K having weight smaller than dw is exponentially small. We should then obtain
TrXρκ,s,b¯ = tv + ηκ,v, where tv is independent of κ and ηκ,v is exponentially small. This result is
enough to complete the privacy proof in a similar manner as described below.
For any normalized attack by Eve-Bob on BB84MM, we can calculate the probability distribution
P (κ, v) by considering the POVM which corresponds to the hypothetical scenario in which Alice
announces her key κ after the protocol is completed. Since the key κ is revealed only after the
complete protocol has finished and the measurement performed on the photons thus cannot depend
on it, this POVM can be seen to satisfy Fκ,v = Π
C
y(v),κ ⊗ ESv . We thus calculate
P (κ, v) = TrFκ,vρ = P (κ, y)TrE
S
v ρκ,y. (74)
For ease of notation, we can reorder indices and write HS = HKS ⊗HKS , where HKS is the state space
of all the photons in the set SK on which the key is defined. We can also split ρκ,y = ρ
K
κ,y ⊗ ρK¯v
correspondingly. We can then use Lemma A.1 to define EKv = TrHK¯S
ESv ρκ,y, which only depends on
v, and one can check
P (κ, v) = P (κ, y)TrEKv ρ
K
κ,y, (75)
where the trace now runs over HKS .
For any nonnegative operator X on HKS and for any y ∈ Y and κ ∈ Fm2 , we define the ratio
rκ,y(X) =
TrXρKκ,y
TrXρKy
, (76)
with the convention that rκ,y(X) = 1 whenever the expression above is undefined. It is easy to see
that rκ,y(X) ≥ 0 and ∑
κ∈Fm2
rκ,y(X) = 2
m. (77)
26
The following proposition shows that for any view v which satisfies the small sphere property,
the joint probabilities P (κ, v) for all keys κ are very similar and hence v does not leak a significant
amount of information about the key.
Proposition 5.9. Consider the BB84MM protocol in which a quasiperfect source with parameters
(βqp, γqp) is used and suppose that the conditions in Assumption 4.1 hold. Consider any normalized
attack by Eve-Bob on BB84MM and let P be the associated probability distribution. Let ǫw be such
that 12dw = (
1
1−λδP +
1
2γqp + ǫw)n and note that ǫw ≥ ǫ. Consider any view v in Lǫw and write
Π˜0 = Π˜0(z, ǫw). Then
P (κ, v) = πv + ηκ,v, (78)
in which πv is a constant independent of κ and ηκ,v is bounded according to
ηκ,v ≤ 2−mP (v)
(
rκ,y(E
K
v ) + rκ,v(Π˜0E
K
v Π˜0)
)
h(n, ǫ), (79)
where h(n, ǫ) = 2g(n, ǫ)
1
4 + g(n, ǫ)
1
2 .
Proof. Note that due to the fact that the rows of K and F are linearly independent and each value
of g[SK] is equally probable, P (κ, y) = 2
−mP (y) and
∑
κ∈Fm2
ρKκ,y = 2
mρKy . This gives us
P (κ, v) = 2−mP (y)TrEKv ρ
K
κ,y. (80)
Write Π˜0 for 1− Π˜0. Using the identity
X = (A+A)X(A+A) = AXA+AX(A+ 12A) + (A+
1
2A)XA =
AXA+AX(I − 12A) + (I − 12A)XA = AXA+AX +XA−AXA,
(81)
we obtain
2m 1P (y)P (κ, v) = TrE
K
v Π˜0ρ
K
κ,yΠ˜0
+ TrEKv Π˜0ρ
K
κ,y +TrE
K
v ρ
K
κ,yΠ˜0
− TrEKv Π˜0ρKκ,yΠ˜0.
(82)
Proposition 5.8 implies that TrEKv Π˜0ρ
K
κ,yΠ˜0 is independent of κ, so we define
πv = 2
−mP (y)TrEKv Π˜0ρ
K
κ,yΠ˜0,
ηκ,v = 2
−mP (y)
(
TrEKv Π˜0ρ
K
κ,y +TrE
K
v ρ
K
κ,yΠ˜0 − TrEKv Π˜0ρKκ,yΠ˜0
)
.
(83)
We now make the decomposition EKv =
∑
l |φKl,v〉〈φKl,v |. Noting that the first two terms of ηκ,v
are complex conjugates, we obtain
|ηκ,v| ≤ 2−mP (y)
(
2
∑
l
∣∣∣〈φKl,v|Π˜0ρKκ,y|φKl,v〉∣∣∣+TrEKv Π˜0ρκ,yΠ˜0). (84)
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Since ρKκ,y is a nonnegative hermitian matrix, we may employ the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality to
write ∣∣∣〈φKl,v|Π˜0ρKκ,y|φKl,v〉∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣〈φKl,v|Π˜0(ρKκ,y) 12 (ρKκ,y) 12 |φKl,v〉∣∣∣ ≤
〈φKl,v |Π˜0ρKκ,yΠ˜0|φKl,v〉
1
2 〈φKl,v|ρKκ,y|φKl,v〉
1
2 .
(85)
Another application of Cauchy-Schwartz yields∑
l
∣∣∣〈φKl,v|Π˜0ρKκ,y|φKl,v〉∣∣∣ ≤ (∑l〈φKl,v|Π˜0ρKκ,yΠ˜0|φKl,v〉) 12 (∑l〈φKl,v|ρKκ,y|φKl,v〉) 12 =(
TrEKv Π˜0ρ
K
κ,yΠ˜0
) 1
2
(
TrEKv ρ
K
κ,y
) 1
2 ,
(86)
and thus
|ηκ,v| ≤ 2−mP (y)
(
TrEKv Π˜0ρ
K
κ,yΠ˜0
) 1
2
(
(TrEKv Π˜0ρ
K
κ,yΠ˜0)
1
2 + 2(TrEKv ρ
K
κ,y)
1
2
)
=
2−mP (y)
(
rκ,y(Π˜0E
K
v Π˜0)TrE
K
v Π˜0ρ
K
y Π˜0
) 1
2
(
rκ,y(Π˜0E
K
v Π˜0)
1
2TrEKv Π˜0ρ
K
y Π˜
1
2
0 + 2rκ,y(E
K
v )
1
2 (TrEKv ρ
K
y )
1
2
)
≤
2−mmax{rκ,y(EKv ), rκ,y(Π˜0EKv Π˜0)}
(
P (y)TrEKv Π˜0ρ
K
y Π˜0
) 1
2
((
P (y)TrEKv Π˜0ρ
K
y Π˜0
) 1
2 + 2
(
P (y)TrEKv ρ
K
y
) 1
2
)
(87)
We now use the identity P (y)TrEKv ρ
K
y = TrFvρ = P (v) together with the fact that v ∈ Lǫw to
obtain the bound
|ηκ,v| ≤ 2−m
(
rκ,y(E
K) + rκ,y(Π˜0E
K
v Π˜0)
)
(
√
g(n, ǫ)P (v))
1
2
(
(
√
g(n, ǫ)P (v))
1
2 + 2P (v)
1
2
)
=
2−mP (v)
(
rκ,y(E
K) + rκ,y(Π˜0E
K
v Π˜0)
)(
2g(n, ǫ)
1
4 + g(n, ǫ)
1
2
)
,
(88)
which concludes the proof.
We now have all the ingredients which are necessary to complete the privacy proof.
Proof of Theorem 5.3. Define ǫw and Π˜0 as in the statement of Proposition 5.9. Fix a view v ∈ Lǫw
and a real number q ≥ 1. For convenience, define
aκ,v = rκ,v(Π˜0E
K
v Π˜0) + rκ,v(E
K
v ). (89)
Note that
P (v) =
∑
κ∈Fm2
P (κ, v) = 2mπv +
∑
κ∈Fm2
ηκ,v, (90)
and thus recalling (77)
|P (v)− 2mπv| ≤
∑
κ∈Fm2
|ηκ,v| ≤ 2−mP (v)h(n, ǫ)
( ∑
κ∈Fm2
aκ,v
)
= 2P (v)h(n, ǫ). (91)
From this we obtain the bound∣∣∣∣P (κ | v)− 12m
∣∣∣∣ = 1P (v)
∣∣∣∣P (κ, v)− 12mP (v)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1P (v)( |P (κ, v)− πv|+
∣∣∣∣πv − 12mP (v)
∣∣∣∣ ) ≤ 12mh(n, ǫ)(aκ,v+2).
(92)
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Recalling that
∑
κ∈Fm2
aκ,v = 2
m+1, we see that the set Kv = {κ ∈ Fm2 | aκ,v < 2q} has at least
2m(1 − 1q ) elements. Thus defining the set I = Fm2 ×
⋃
v∈Lǫw
{v} × Kv ⊆ V , we see that for all
(κ, v) ∈ I, ∣∣∣∣P (κ | v)− 12m
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 12m (2q + 2)h(n, ǫ). (93)
Now, since Alice chooses her key uniform randomly when the test P is not passed, we have
H(κ | v) = −
∑
κ,v
P (κ, v) log2 P (κ | v) ≥ mP (P)−
∑
(κ,v)∈I
P (κ, v) log2 P (κ | v), (94)
where the inequality was obtained by noting that log2 p ≤ 0 for all 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 and that I ⊆ P × Fm2 .
Writing P (κ | v) = 12m (1+ξκ,v) ≥ 0, where |ξκ,v| ≤ (2q+2)h(n, ǫ), noting that C(1+x) log2(1+x) ≤
C(1 + x) |x|ln 2 for any x ≥ −1 and using P (I) ≤ 1, we see
H(κ | v) ≥ mP (P)−
∑
(κ,v)∈I
P (κ, v)(−m+ (2q + 2)h(n, ǫ)
ln 2
) = m
(
(P (P) + P (I))− (2q + 2)h(n, ǫ)
ln 2
.
(95)
Using (93) it is easy to see that
P (I) =∑v∈Lǫw P (v)∑k∈Kv P (κ | v) ≥ P (Lǫw)(1 − 1q )(1− (2q + 2)h(n, ǫ)). (96)
From the above identity, we conclude
H(κ | v) ≥ m
(
P (P) + (1− 1q )(1− (2q + 2)h(n, ǫ))(P (P)− P (P ∩ Lǫw))
)
− (2q+2)h(n,ǫ)ln 2
≥ m− mq − (m+ 1ln 2 )(2q + 2)h(n, ǫ)−mP (P ∩ Lǫw).
(97)
Now choose q =
√
m
2(m+ 1ln 2 )h(n,ǫ)
. It is easy to see that there exists a function N(ǫ) which depends
only on ǫ, such that q ≥ 1 for all n ≥ N(ǫ). Thus, for all n ≥ N(ǫ), we have
H(κ | v) ≥ m− ǫ1(n, ǫ,m) (98)
in which
ǫ1(n,m, ǫ) = 2(m+
1
ln 2
)h(n, ǫ) + 2
√
2(m+
1
ln 2
)mh(n, ǫ) +mP (P ∩ Lǫw). (99)
Corollary 5.7 now implies that ǫ1 satisfies the condition (17), which completes the proof.
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A Technical Issues
In this appendix, we present some technical lemma’s which were used. The first lemma concerns the
reduction of a trace to a smaller Hilbert space.
Lemma A.1. Consider two finite dimensional Hilbert spaces HA, HB and the product Hilbert space
H = HA ⊗ HB. Consider two density matrices ρA and ρB over HA and HB respectively and let
ρ = ρA ⊗ ρB. Then for any measurement operator F acting on H, there exists a measurement
operator F ′ρB on HA which depends only on ρB, such that
TrHFρ = TrHAF
′
ρBρ
A. (100)
In addition, for any set {Fq}q∈Q of measurement operators on H such that∑
q∈Q
Fq = 1H, (101)
we have that
∑
q∈Q F
′
q,ρB = 1HA
Proof. Let nA and nB denote the dimension of HA respectively HB. For any four-tuple of integers
(iA, jA, iB, jB) such that 1 ≤ iA, jA ≤ nA and 1 ≤ iB, jB ≤ nB, define eiA,jA,iB ,jB = eAiA,jA ⊗ eBiB ,jB ,
where eAiA,jA is the nA × nA matrix which has a 1 at position (iA, jA) and zeroes elsewhere and eB
is defined similarly. Any square matrix X on H can be decomposed as
X =
∑
(iA,jA,iB ,jB)
X iA,jAiB ,jB e
iB ,jB
iA,jA
. (102)
Thus defining
X ′ρB =
∑
iA,jA
eAiA,jA
∑
iB ,jB
X iA,jAiB ,jBTrBe
B
iB ,jBρ
B, (103)
we see that indeed TrHXρ = TrAX
′
ρBρ
A. The fact that X ′ρB is a nonnegative operator can be seen
by taking ρA = |α〉〈α| for any normalized state |α〉 in HA and noting that
〈α|X ′ρB |α〉 = TrAX ′ρB |α〉〈α| = TrHX |α〉〈α| ⊗ ρB ≥ 0. (104)
The last claim in the lemma can be verified by noting that (X+Y )′ρB = X
′
ρB +Y
′
ρB and 1
′
ρB = 1HA ,
since TrBρ
B = 1.
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The following result gives a bound on the success rate of any quantum measurement which must
distinguish between two quantum states. In addition, it shows that performing collective measure-
ments on random sequences of these two states does not improve the success rate on individual
positions.
Theorem A.2. Consider two pairs of density matrices (ρ0a, ρ
1
a), for a = 0, 1. Denote by Sa the
set of eigenvalues λ of the matrix ρ0a − ρ1a and define the quantity ∆ = maxa=0,1
∑
λ∈Sa
|λ|. Fix an
integer N and a string ~a ∈ FN2 . Let a source emit a sequence of N states, given by a string g, where
g[i] = 0 when ρ0a[i] was emitted and g[i] = 1 otherwise. Suppose that at each position both possible
states have equal probabilities to occur, i.e. P (g[i] = 0) = P (g[i] = 1) = 12 . Consider an arbitrary
measurement on the system which gives guesses ~h for ~g for m ≤ N different positions. Then the
probability that the m guesses are all correct is bounded by
Psuccess ≤
(1
2
+
1
4
∆
)m
. (105)
Proof. We assume that ~a = 0. With the addition of some bookkeeping arguments the proof given
below can be seen to hold for all strings ~a. We model the emission of the source as a state in
HC ⊗HS , in which HC is the classical space consisting of bit-strings in FN2 and HS = H⊗N is the
state space for the emitted quantum states. Without loss of generality, we shall assume that the
m positions for which the guess h is supplied are the first m positions. Correspondingly, we write
g′ ∈ Fm2 for the first m bits of g. The measurement determining the guess h and the subsequent
announcement of g′ can be described by the POVM
{(h, g′),ΠCg′ ⊗ Fh}, (106)
since the measurement on the quantum states is independent of the announcement g′. The proba-
bility of success thus reads, using Lemma 5.5,
Psuccess = 2
−m
∑
g′∈Fm2
TrFg′ρ
S
g′ , (107)
where
ρSg′ = 2
m−N
m⊗
k=1
ρg′[k] ⊗
(
ρ1 + ρ2
)⊗N−m
. (108)
Splitting HS = H⊗m ⊗ Hrest and using Lemma A.1 to perform the trace over Hrest, we obtain
Psuccess = TrTm, in which the trace runs over H
⊗m and Tm is given by
Tm = 2
−m
∑
g′∈Fm2
F ′g′ρ
S
g′ . (109)
Consider the linear space W spanned by words over the alphabet {F 0, F 1, ρ0, ρ1}. For every word
w = w1w2 . . . w2m, we define the normalized word N (w), which reorders symbols wi such that each
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F a stands to the left of each ρb, but that otherwise leaves the ordering invariant. For example,
N (F 0ρ1F 1ρ0) = F 0F 1ρ1ρ0. (110)
For every normalized codeword of the form
F v[1] . . . F v[m]ρw[1] . . . ρw[m] (111)
we define the corresponding matrixM(w) = F ′vρw. These operators can be extended to the complete
linear space W by simply linearizing. We recursively define elements in W by W0 = ∅ and
Wj = (F
0ρ0 + F 1ρ1)Wj−1 =
(
(F 0 + F 1)
1
2
(ρ0 + ρ1) + (F 0 − F 1)1
2
(ρ0 − ρ1))Wj−1. (112)
It is not hard to see Tm = 2
−mM(N (Wm)). Write Wm = (A0+A1)m, where A0 = (F 0+F 1)12 (ρ0+
ρ1) and A1 = (F
0−F 1)12 (ρ0−ρ1). For any v ∈ Fm2 , we define the element Av = Av[0]Av[1] . . . Av[m].
We shall compute TrM(Av). Without loss of generality, we shall assume that v = (0, . . . 0, 1, . . .1)
with d(v, 0) = s. Using Lemma A.1 to perform the trace over the first m − s positions, we are left
with
TrM(Av) =
∑
w∈Fs2
ǫ(w)2−sTrF ′′w(ρ
0 − ρ1)⊗s, (113)
where F ′′w =
∑
r∈Fm−s2
(F ′rw)
′
( 12 (ρ
0+ρ1))⊗m−s
and where ǫ(w) = (−1)d(w,0) is a ±1 valued function.
Pass to a basis for which ρ0 − ρ1 is diagonal and let F ′′′w be F ′′w in this basis. Note that we have∑
w∈Fs2
F ′′′w = 1Hs and that each F
′′′
w is a measurement operator, which means that all the diagonal
elements dii of
∑
w∈Fs2
ǫ(w)F ′′′w have norm |dii| ≤ 1. In particular, this means
|TrM(Av)| ≤ 2−s∆s. (114)
We can thus compute, summing TrM(Av) over all v,
TrTm ≤ 2−m(1 + ∆
2
)m, (115)
which proves the claim.
The following two results are standard bounds on the tails of binomial distributions.
Lemma A.3. Let p, r and t be positive numbers such that 0 < r ≤ p < p + t < 1. Let nr and
np be two positive integers and define the set V = {(ir, ip) ∈ N0 × N0 | ir + ip ≥ (p+ t)n}, where
n = nr + np. Then ∑
(ir ,ip)∈V
(
np
ip
)(
nr
ir
)
pip(1− p)np−iprir (1− r)nr−ir ≤ e−2t2n. (116)
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Proof. For simplicity, we define q = 1− p, s = 1− r, k = ⌈(p+ t)n⌉ and write
S =
∑
(ir ,ip)∈V
(
np
ip
)(
nr
ir
)
pip(1 − p)np−iprir (1− r)nr−ir . (117)
Then for any x ≥ 1, one has
S ≤ ∑(ir ,ip)∈V (npip )(nrir )pip(1− p)np−ipxip−krir (1− r)nr−irxir−k
≤ ∑0≤ip≤np∑0≤ir≤nr (npip )(nrir )pip(1− p)np−iprir (1− r)nr−ir
= 1
xk
(q + px)np(s+ rx)nr ≤ 1
x(p+t)n
(q + px)np(s+ rx)nr ≤ 1
x(p+t)n
(q + px)n,
(118)
where we have used s+ rx ≤ q + px in the last inequality. Fixing x = q(p+t)p(q−t) ≥ 1, we obtain
S ≤
[( p
p+ t
)p+t( q
q − t
)q−t]n
. (119)
Define the function
g(t) = ln
[( p
p+ t
)p+t( q
q − t
)q−t]
. (120)
It is easy to see that g is C∞ on [0, q], so we may employ Taylor’s formula to get
g(t) = g(0) + tg′(0) +
∫ t
0
g′′(u)(t− u)du. (121)
Notice that g(0) = g′(0) = 0 and g′′(u) = − 1(p+u)(q−u) ≤ −4 for any u ∈ [0, q]. Therefore g(t) ≤ −2t2
from which the statement follows.
Corollary A.4. Let p, r and t be positive numbers such that 0 < r − t ≤ r ≤ p < 1. Let nr
and np be two positive integers and define the set V = {(ir, ip) ∈ N× N | ir + ip ≤ (r − t)n}, where
n = nr + np. Then ∑
(ir ,ip)∈V
(
np
ip
)(
nr
ir
)
pip(1− p)np−iprir (1− r)nr−ir ≤ e−2t2n. (122)
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma A.3 by making the substitutions r→ 1− r, p→ 1− p
and recalling that
(
n
k
)
=
(
n
n−k
)
.
This next result is a classic result which follows directly from the shape of the logarithm.
Lemma A.5 (Jensen). Consider real numbers a1, . . . am and b1, . . . bm and suppose that 0 ≤ a1 ≤ 1,
bi > 0 and
∑m
i=1 ai = 1. Then
m∑
i=1
ai log2 bi ≤ log2
m∑
i=1
aibi. (123)
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Lemma A.6. Let µ > 0 be a strictly positive real number. Let y be a random variable taking values
in a set Y and let {ay}y∈Y be a set of |Y| real nonnegative numbers such that
∑
y∈Y ay ≤ µ. Let q
be a strictly positive number and define the subset S ⊆ Y by
X = {y ∈ Y | ay ≤ µqPy(y). (124)
Then Py(X ) ≥ 1− 1q .
Proof. Assume to the contrary that Py(Y \ X ) > 1q . Then∑
y∈Y
ay ≥
∑
y∈Y\X
ay > µq
∑
y∈Y\X
Py(y) = µqP (Y \ X ) > µ, (125)
which is a contradiction.
B Error Correcting Codes
Consider two integers which satisfy 1 ≤ k ≤ n and let G be a k × n binary matrix with linearly
independent rows. Define the set S(G) = {w ∈ Fn2 | w = vG for some v ∈ Fk2}, which is a linear
subspace of Fn2 of dimension k. Letting dG = ming∈S(G) d(g, 0) be the the minimum weight of strings
in S(G), we say that the set S(G) is a (n, k) linear code with minimum distance dG. For any such
matrix G the map EncG : F
k
2 → Fn2 which sends v → vG is an inclusion from Fk2 into Fn2 and can
be used to encode messages in Fk2 into strings in the larger space F
n
2 . The intuitive idea of an error
correcting code is to use the redundancy in this encoding to protect any encoded string from bitflips
in a small number of positions. This is usually done by means of minimal distance decoding, that
is, for any string s ∈ Fn2 , one defines DecG(s) ∈ Fk2 to be a string sorg that minimizes d(sorgG, s).
Let t be any positive integer satisfying 2t + 1 ≤ dG and let e ∈ Fn2 be an arbitrary string with
weight d(e, 0) = t. Since d(Enc(sorg), Enc(s
′
org)) = d((sorg ⊖ s′org)G, 0) ≥ dG ≥ 2t + 1 whenever
sorg 6= s′org, we see that we must have DecG(Enc(sorg)⊕ e) = sorg for any message sorg ∈ Fk2 . We
thus see that the decoding scheme functions correctly whenever the number of bitflips which have
occurred on the encoded string does not exceed tmax = ⌊dG−12 ⌋ and we correspondingly say that the
code S(G) is an error correcting code which can correct tmax errors.
It can be shown that there exists a binary (n− k)× n matrix H for which Hg = 0 if and only if
g ∈ S(G). This matrix is called the parity check matrix of the code S(G). For a given x ∈ Fn2 , we
call s = Hx the syndrome of x. Notice that whenever two strings x, x′ share the same syndrome s,
we have H(x⊖ x′) = Hx⊖Hx′ = s⊖ s = 0 and hence x⊖ x′ ∈ S(G). We can exploit this fact by
defining a decode function DecsG : F
n
2 → Fn2 which computes DecsG(y) = x for any x which satisfies
Hx = s and d(y, x) = min{d(y, x′) | Hx′ = s}. Using the same arguments as above, it can be seen
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that for any error string e with d(e, 0) ≤ tmax, we have DecHxG (x ⊕ e) = x. This fact was used to
prove that Alice and Bob share the same secret key at the end of the protocol if dSK(g, h) ≤ δP + ǫ.
The next basic results give some minimal bounds on the efficiency of error correcting codes and
were used to establish the worst-case asymptotic rate of key generation (18).
Lemma B.1 (Gilbert-Varshamov). For any strictly positive integers n, r, t which satisfy
2r+1 >
2t∑
i=0
(
n
k
)
, (126)
there exists a linear (n, n− r) code which can correct t errors.
Proof. We will construct a n− r × n generator matrix G of a code which has minimum distance d
which satisfies d ≥ 2t+ 1 and can hence correct t errors. Set v1 to be an arbitrary vector from Fn2
which has weight 2t + 1 and iteratively choose vectors vi such that for every i the set {v1, . . . , vi}
is linearly independent and all the nonzero vectors in span({v1, . . . , vi}) have a weight of at least
2t + 1. For any i, this is possible if there are still vectors in Fn2 outside the spheres of radius 2t
around the 2i−1 codewords in span({v1, . . . vi}). Since each sphere of radius 2t contains
∑2t
i=0
(
n
k
)
points, (126) implies that we can construct v1, . . . , vn−r in this way. The claim immediately follows
if we let v1, . . . , vn−r be the rows of G.
Lemma B.2 ([12, Corollary 9]). For any 0 < µ < 12 and for any integer n, we have
⌊µn⌋∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
≤ 2nH2(µ), (127)
where H2(µ) is the binary entropy function H2(µ) = −(µ lnµ+ (1 − µ) ln(1− µ)).
Combining the previous two lemma’s gives us the following asymptotic expression of the Gilbert-
Varshamov bound.
Corollary B.3. Fix 0 < δ < 14 . Then for every n there exists an (n, n − r) error correcting code
that can correct ⌊δn⌋ errors for some r which satisfies
r
n
≤ H2(2δ). (128)
Lemma B.4. Fix three positive integers r, n and dmin and consider an arbitrary r×n binary matrix
F with linearly independent rows. Let F be the set containing the r rows of the matrix F . Suppose
that 2n−r−m+1 >
∑dmin−1
i=0
(
n
i
)
. Then there exists a set W containing m vectors in Fn2 such that the
set W ∪ F is linearly independent and for every v in the set span(W ∪ F) \ span(F), the inequality
d(v) ≥ dmin holds for the weight d(v) = d(v, 0).
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Proof. Let S be the set of vectors v in FN2 which have weight d(v) < dmin. Then |S| =
∑dmin−1
i=0
(
n
i
)
.
We inductively define a sequence of sets Wi for 0 ≤ i ≤ m with the property that Wi contains
i distinct vectors from Fn2 , the set Wi ∪ F is linearly independent and d(v) ≥ dmin for every
v ∈ span(Wi ∪ F) \ span(F). Let W0 = ∅ which can easily be seen to satisfy the above properties.
For any 0 ≤ i < m, let Wi = span(Wi ∪ F). Since there are 2n−r−i ≥ 2n−r−m+1 > |S| distinct
cosets ofWi in Fn2 , there is at least one such coset which has empty intersection with S. Let wi+1 be
a representative of such a coset and define Wi+1 = {wi+1} ∪Wi. It is easy to see that if Wi satisfies
the properties mentioned above, then this also holds for Wi+1 and the set Wm can thus indeed be
defined. This completes the proof.
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